Motivated by the recent efforts in extending long term evolution (LTE) to the unlicensed spectrum, we propose a novel spectrum sharing framework for the coopetition (i.e., cooperation and competition) between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. Basically, the LTE network can choose to work in one of the two modes: in the competition mode, it randomly accesses an unlicensed channel, and interferes with the Wi-Fi access point using the same channel; in the cooperation mode, it onloads the Wi-Fi users' traffic in exchange for the exclusive access of the corresponding channel. We design a second-price reverse auction mechanism, which enables the LTE provider and the Wi-Fi access point owners (APOs) to effectively negotiate the operation mode. Specifically, the LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer), and the APOs are the bidders (sellers) who compete to sell the rights of onloading the APOs' traffic to the LTE provider. In Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces a reserve rate, which is the maximum data rate that it is willing to allocate to the APOs in the cooperation mode. In Stage II of the auction, the APOs submit their bids, which indicate the data rates that they would like the LTE provider to offer in the cooperation mode. We show that the auction involves allocative externalities, i.e., the cooperation between the LTE provider and one APO benefits other APOs who are not directly involved in this cooperation. We characterize the APOs' unique equilibrium bidding strategies in Stage II, and analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate in Stage I. Numerical results show that our framework improves the payoffs of both the LTE provider and the APOs comparing with a benchmark scheme. In particular, our framework increases the LTE provider's payoff by 70% on average, when the LTE provider has a large throughput and a small data rate discounting factor. Moreover, our framework leads to a close-tooptimal social welfare under a large LTE throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations T HE proliferation of mobile devices is leading to an explosion of global mobile traffic, which is estimated to reach 30.6 exabytes per month by 2020 [2] . To accommodate this rapidly growing mobile traffic, 3GPP has been working on proposals to enable LTE to operate in the unlicensed band [3] . By extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum, the LTE provider can significantly expand its network capacity, and tightly integrate its control over the licensed and unlicensed bands [4] . Furthermore, since the LTE technology has an efficient framework of traffic management (e.g., congestion control), it is capable of achieving a much higher spectral efficiency than Wi-Fi networks in the unlicensed spectrum, if there is no competition between these two technologie [5] . Key market players, such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Qualcomm, and Ericsson, have already demonstrated the potential of LTE in the unlicensed band through experiments [5] , and have formed several forums (e.g., LTE-U Forum [6] and EVOLVE [7] ) to promote this promising LTE unlicensed technology.
A key technical challenge for LTE working in the unlicensed spectrum is that it can significantly degrade the Wi-Fi network performance if there is no effective co-channel interference avoidance mechanism. To address this issue, industries have proposed two major mechanisms for LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence: (a) Qualcomm's carrier-sensing adaptive transmission (CSAT) scheme [8] , where the LTE transmission follows a periodic on/off pattern creating interference-free zones for Wi-Fi during certain periods, and (b) Ericsson's "Listen-Before-Talk" (LBT) scheme [9] , where LTE transmits only when it senses the channel being idle for at least certain duration. However, field tests revealed that these solutions often perform below expectations in practice. In particular, a series of experiments by Google revealed that both mechanisms severely affect the performance of Wi-Fi [10] : for the CSAT mechanism, since Wi-Fi is not designed in anticipation of LTE's activity, it cannot respond well to LTE's on-off cycling, and its transmission is severely affected; for the LBT mechanism, it is challenging to choose the proper backoff time and transmission length for LTE to fairly coexist with Wi-Fi. Therefore, beyond these coexistence mechanisms, there is a need for a novel framework that can effectively explore the potential cooperation opportunity between LTE and Wi-Fi to directly avoid the co-channel interference. This motivates our study in this work. 0733 -8716 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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B. Contributions
Unlike previous solely technical coexistence mechanisms that focused on the fair competition between LTE and Wi-Fi, we design a novel coopetition framework. The basic idea is that the two types of networks (LTE and Wi-Fi) should explore the potential benefits of cooperation before deciding whether to enter head-to-head competition. Under certain conditions (e.g., the co-channel interference heavily reduces the data rates of both LTE and Wi-Fi), it would be more beneficial for both types of networks to reach an agreement on the cooperation; otherwise, they will compete with each other based on a typical coexistence mechanism (e.g., CSAT or LBT).
In our coopetition framework, the LTE network works in either the competition mode or the cooperation mode. For the competition mode, the LTE network simply shares the access of a channel with the corresponding Wi-Fi access point. For the cooperation mode, the LTE network exclusively occupies a Wi-Fi access point's channel and the corresponding Wi-Fi access point does not transmit, which avoids the co-channel interference and hence generates a high LTE data rate. Meanwhile, the Wi-Fi access point onloads its users to the LTE network, which serves the Wi-Fi access point's users with some data rates based on the access point's request. Since LTE usually achieves a much higher spectral efficiency than Wi-Fi [5] , [11] , such a cooperation can potentially lead to a win-win situation for both networks.
In our work, we want to answer the following two questions: (1) How would LTE and Wi-Fi negotiate over which mode (competition mode or cooperation mode) that LTE would use? (2) If the LTE network works in the cooperation mode, how much Wi-Fi traffic should it serve? Addressing these questions is challenging because of the following reasons: (i) given the increasingly large penetration of Wi-Fi technology, there are usually multiple Wi-Fi networks in range. As we will show in our analysis, the cooperation between the LTE network and one Wi-Fi network imposes a positive externality to other Wi-Fi networks not involved in the cooperation; (ii) there is no centralized decision maker in such a system, and different networks have conflicting interests as each of them wants to maximize the total data rate received by its own users; (iii) the throughput of a network (LTE or Wi-Fi) when it exclusively occupies a channel is its private information not known by others, which makes the coordination difficult.
To address these issues, in Section II, we design a mechanism that operates with minimum signaling and computations, and can be implemented in an almost real-time fashion. Specifically, the mechanism is based on a reverse auction where the LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer) and wants to exclusively obtain the channel from one of the Wi-Fi access point owners (APOs, sellers). We define the payoff of a network (LTE or Wi-Fi) as the total data rate received by its users. In Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces the maximum data rate (i.e., reserve rate) that it is willing to allocate for serving users of the winning APO. By optimizing the reserve rate, the LTE provider can affect the APOs' willingness of cooperation, and hence maximize its expected payoff. In Stage II of the auction, given the reserve rate, the APOs report whether they are willing to cooperate and what are the data rates that they request from the LTE provider. Different APOs may have different requests, since they can have different data rates when exclusively occupying their channels. If no APO wants to cooperate, the LTE network works in the competition mode, and randomly accesses an APO's channel (based on a coexistence mechanism like CSAT or LBT); otherwise, it works in the cooperation mode, and cooperates with the APO that requests the lowest data rate from the LTE provider. Such an auction mechanism is particularly challenging to analyze since it induces positive allocative externalities [12] : the cooperation between the LTE provider and one APO will benefit other APOs not involved in this collaboration, because other APOs can avoid the potential interference generated by the LTE network under the competition mode.
In Section III, we analyze the APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II of the auction, given the LTE provider's reserve rate in Stage I. We show that an APO always has a unique form of the bidding strategy at the equilibrium under a given reserve rate. However, such a unique form of the bidding strategy may have different closed-form expressions based on different intervals of the reserve rate. Furthermore, our study shows that for some APOs, the data rates they request from the LTE provider are lower than the rates they can obtain by themselves without the LTE's interference. Intuitively, such a low request motivates the LTE network to work in the cooperation mode rather than the competition mode. In the latter case, the APOs may receive even lower data rates due to the potential co-channel interference from the LTE network.
In Section IV, we analyze the LTE provider's equilibrium choice of reserve rate in Stage I of the auction, by anticipating the APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II. The LTE network's expected payoff has different closed-form function forms, over different intervals of the reserve rate. We analyze the optimal reserve rate by jointly considering all the reserve rate intervals. We show that when the LTE network's throughout exceeds a threshold, it will choose a reasonably large reserve rate and cooperate with some APOs; otherwise, it will restrict the reserve rate to a small value, and eventually work in the competition mode.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• Proposal of the LTE/Wi-Fi coopetition framework: We propose a coopetition framework that explores the cooperation opportunity between LTE and Wi-Fi in order to determine whether they should directly compete with each other. Unlike previously proposed LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence mechanisms, our framework can avoid the data rate reduction when there is a cooperation opportunity between LTE and Wi-Fi. Furthermore, our framework can be implemented without revealing the private throughput information of the networks. • Equilibrium analysis of the auction with allocative externalities: We provide rigorous analysis for an auction mechanism with positive allocative externalities that involves more than two bidders. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work studying such a mechanism in auction theory. Our work introduces a methodology for modeling and analyzing the allocative dependencies that arise increasingly often in wireless systems. • Performance evaluation of the LTE/Wi-Fi coopetition framework: Numerical results show that our framework achieves larger LTE's and APOs' payoffs comparing with a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme, which only considers the competition between LTE and APOs. In particular, our framework increases the LTE's payoff by 70% on average when the LTE has a large throughput and a small data rate discounting factor. Furthermore, our framework leads to a close-to-optimal social welfare for a large LTE throughput.
C. Related Work
Several recent studies focused on the spectrum sharing problems for the LTE unlicensed technology. Cano et al. in [11] and Zhang et al. in [13] discussed the major challenges for the LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence. Chen et al. in [14] jointly considered the Wi-Fi data offloading and the spectrum sharing between the LTE and Wi-Fi. Cano and Leith [15] studied the LTE network's channel access probability in the CSAT mechanism to ensure the fairness between LTE and Wi-Fi. Zhang et al. in [16] proposed a new LBT-based MAC protocol that allows LTE to friendly coexist with Wi-Fi. Guan and Melodia [17] investigated the LTE provider's joint channel selection and fractional spectrum access problem with the consideration of the fairness between LTE and Wi-Fi. Zhang et al. in [18] analyzed the spectrum sharing among multiple LTE providers in the unlicensed spectrum through a hierarchical game. However, these studies did not consider the cooperation between LTE and Wi-Fi. We include the existing studies on LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence like [15] , [16] as part of our framework (i.e., in the competition mode), and also consider the new possibility of cooperation between LTE and Wi-Fi (i.e., in the cooperation mode).
In terms of the auction with allocative externalities, the most relevant works are [12] and [19] . Jehiel and Moldovanu in [12] provided a systematic study of the second-price forward auction with allocative externalities. They characterized the bidders' bidding strategies at the equilibrium for general payoff functions. However, they did not prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies. Bagwell et al. in [19] studied a special example in the WTO system, where the retaliation rights were allocated through a first-price forward auction among different countries. The auction involves positive allocative externalities, and the authors showed the uniqueness of the countries' bidding strategies. Both [12] and [19] only studied two bidders in the auction. In contrast, we consider an auction with an arbitrary number of bidders, and show the impact of the number of bidders on the auction outcome. Furthermore, the bidders' equilibrium strategies have different expressions under different reserve rates announced by the auctioneer, which makes our analysis of the optimal reserve rate much more challenging than [12] and [19] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Basic Settings
We consider a time-slotted system, where the length of each time slot corresponds to several minutes. We assume that the system is quasi-static, i.e., the system parameters (which involve mostly time average values) remain constant during each time slot, but can change over time slots. Our analysis focuses on the interaction between LTE and Wi-Fi networks in a single generic time slot. 1 We consider one LTE small cell network and a set K {1, 2, . . . , K } (K ≥ 2) of Wi-Fi access points. The LTE small cell network is owned by an LTE provider, 2 and the k-th (k ∈ K ) Wi-Fi access point is owned by APO k. We assume that the APOs occupy different unlicensed channels so that they do not interfere with each other. We use channel k to represent the channel occupied by APO k. The LTE small cell network has a larger coverage area than the Wi-Fi access points [5] , [8] . Furthermore, it can work in one of the K channels, and cause interference to the corresponding access point in the channel. 3 The assumption that the APOs occupy different channels simplifies the problem and helps us gain key insights into the proposed auction framework. We leave the discussion of the scenario where different APOs share the same channel in [20] .
1) APOs' Rates: We consider fully loaded APOs, 4 and use r k to denote the throughput that APO k ∈ K can achieve to serve its users when it exclusively occupies channel k (without the interference from the LTE network). The value of r k in the time slot that we are interested in is the private information of APO k. The LTE provider and the other K − 1 APOs only know the probability distribution of r k . Specifically, we assume that r k is a continuous random variable drawn from interval [r min , r max ] (r min , r max ≥ 0), and follows a probability distribution function (PDF) f (·) and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (·). 5 Moreover, we assume that f (·) > 0 for all r ∈ [r min , r max ].
2) LTE's Dual Modes: We consider a fully loaded LTE network, and assume that it achieves a channel independent throughput of R LTE > 0 when it exclusively occupies one of the K channels (without the interference from the APOs). The LTE provider can operate its network in one of the following modes: 1 Our framework works for both the uplink scenario (the networks only have uplink traffic) and downlink scenario (the networks only have downlink traffic). For example, in the uplink scenario, all throughputs in our model correspond to the uplink throughputs. We will study the scenario where the networks serve uplink and downlink traffic simultaneously in our future work. 2 We leave the analysis for the scenario where there are multiple LTE providers in our technical report [20] . 3 For ease of exposition, we use "LTE provider" and "LTE network" interchangeably. Similarly, we use "APO" and "access point" interchangeably. 4 Since the length of each time slot corresponds to several minutes, we assume that a network has enough traffic to serve during a time slot and will not complete its service within a time slot. This assumption simplifies the problem, and helps us understand the fundamental benefit of organizing an auction to onload the Wi-Fi traffic to the LTE network. Many papers made similar saturation assumptions to analyze the network performance [21] , [22] . 5 We assume that all r k (k ∈ K ) follow the same distribution, and hence both functions f (·) and F (·) are independent of index k. We will study problem with the non-identical variable r k in our future work.
-Competition Mode: the LTE provider randomly chooses each channel k ∈ K with an equal probability and coexists with APO k. Since our main focus is the design of the auction framework, the LTE provider simply coexists with APO k based on a typical coexistence mechanism (e.g., CSAT or LBT) and setting (e.g., the LTE's backoff time and transmission length in the LBT). The co-channel interference decreases both the data rates of the LTE provider and the corresponding APO. We use δ LTE ∈ (0, 1) and η APO ∈ (0, 1) to denote the LTE's and the APO's data rate discounting factors, respectively; -Cooperation Mode: the LTE provider reaches an agreement with APO k ∈ K , where APO k stops transmission and the LTE provider exclusively occupies channel k. In this case, there is no co-channel interference, and the LTE provider's data rate is simply R LTE . As a compensation, the LTE provider will serve APO k's users with a guaranteed data rate r pay ∈ [0, R LTE ]. The remaining K −1 APOs occupy their own channels, and are not interfered by the LTE provider. Which APO the LTE provider chooses to cooperate with and what the value r pay should be will be determined through a reverse auction design in the next subsection.
B. Second-Price Reverse Auction Design
We design a second-price reverse auction, where the LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer) and the APOs are the bidders (sellers). The auction is held at the beginning of each time slot. The private type of APO k is r k (i.e., the data rate when it exclusively occupies channel k), and APO k's item for sale is the right of onloading APO k's traffic. When the LTE provider obtains the item from APO k, the LTE provider can onload APO k's traffic and exclusively occupy channel k. Since we assume that the LTE provider cannot occupy more than one channel at the same time, the LTE provider is only interested in obtaining one item from one of the APOs. Different from the conventional reverse auction where the auctioneer pays the winner money to obtain the item, here the LTE serves the winning APO's users with the rate r pay as the payment.
Reserve Rate and Bids: In Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces its reserve rate C ∈ [0, ∞), which corresponds to the maximum data rate that it is willing to accept to serve the winning APO's users. In Stage II of the auction, after observing the reserve rate C,
indicates the data rate that APO k requests the LTE provider to serve APO k's users; (b) b k = "N" means that APO k does not want to sell its item (i.e., the right of onloading APO k's traffic) to the LTE provider. 6 We define the vector of APOs' bids as b (b k , ∀k ∈ K ). The auction design is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Auction Outcomes: Next we discuss the auction outcomes based on the different values of b and C. For ease of exposition, we define the comparison between "N" and any 6 If APO k bids any value greater than the reserve rate C, the LTE provider will not cooperate with APO k based on the definition of C. Hence, any bid greater than C leads to the same result to APO k. In order to facilitate the description, we use "N" to represent any bid greater than C. Intuitively, if the reserve rate C is very small, APO k is more likely to bid "N". In this case, APO k can achieve an expected data rate (considering all possible auction results) higher than that when onloading the users to the LTE provider. 
Furthermore, we use I min to denote the set of APOs with the minimum bid, and define it as
The auction has the following possible outcomes: (a) When |I min | = 1, 7 then APO i = arg min k∈K b k is the winner, and leaves channel i to the LTE provider. The LTE provider works in the cooperation mode and exclusively occupies channel i . Furthermore, the LTE serves APO i 's users with a rate r pay = min {C, b 1 , . . . , b i−1 , b i+1 , . . . , b K }, which is the lowest rate among the reserve rate and all the other APOs' bids, based on the rule of the second-price auction. In this case, the allocated rate r pay is greater than the winning APO's bid (i.e., min k∈K b k );
(b) When min k∈K b k ∈ [0, C] and |I min | > 1, the LTE provider works in the cooperation mode, randomly chooses an APO from set I min with the probability 1 |I min | to exclusively occupy the corresponding channel, and serves the APO's users with a rate r pay = min k∈K b k . In this case, the allocated rate r pay equals the winning APO's bid;
(c) When min k∈K b k = "N", 8 the LTE provider works in the competition mode, randomly chooses one of the K channels with the probability 1 K , and shares the channel with the corresponding APO. 9
C. LTE Provider's Payoff
Based on the summary of auction outcomes in the last subsection, we can write r pay as a function of b and C:
7 Condition |I min | = 1 implies min k∈K b k ∈ [0, C] as we have K ≥ 2. 8 In this case, all APOs bid "N". 9 Because the LTE provider does not have the private information r k , it cannot differentiate the channels. We consider a specific protocol where the LTE provider randomly accesses each channel with an equal probability in the competition mode.
We define the LTE provider's payoff as the data rate that it can allocate to its own users, and compute it as: 10
Equation (4) captures two possible situations: (a) when the minimum bid lies in [0, C], the LTE provider works in the cooperation mode, exclusively occupies a channel, and obtains a total data rate of R LTE . Since the LTE provider needs to allocate a rate of r pay (b, C) to the winning APO's users, its payoff is R LTE − r pay (b, C); (b) when all APOs bid "N", the LTE provider works in the competition mode, and δ LTE ∈ (0, 1) captures the discount in the LTE provider's data rate due to the interference from the Wi-Fi APO in the same channel.
D. APOs' Payoffs and Allocative Externalities
We define the payoff of APO k ∈ K as the data rate that its users receive: when APO k cooperates with the LTE provider, these users are served by the LTE provider; otherwise, they are served by APO k. Based on the summary of auction outcomes in Section II-B and the definition of r pay (b, C) in (3), we summarize APO k's expected payoff as follows:
Equation (5) summarizes three possible situations: (a) when b k > min j ∈K b j , the LTE provider exclusively occupies a channel from one of the APOs (other than APO k) with the minimum bid. As a result, APO k can exclusively occupy its own channel k, and serve its users with rate r k ; (b) when b k = min j ∈K b j ∈ [0, C], the LTE provider cooperates with APO k and one of the other APOs with the minimum bid with the probability 1 |I min | and the probability 1− 1 |I min | (1 ≤ |I min | ≤ K ), respectively. Hence, APO k's users receive rate r pay (b, C) and rate r k with the probability 1 |I min | and the probability 1 − 1 |I min | , respectively. In this case, the expected data rate that APO k's users receive is 1 |I min | r pay (b, C) + |I min |−1 |I min | r k ,; (c) when min j ∈K b j = "N", there is no winner in the auction, and the LTE provider randomly chooses one of the K channels to coexist with the corresponding APO. With the probability 1 K , APO k coexists with the LTE provider and has a data rate of η APO r k ; with the probability 1 − 1 K , APO k has a data rate of r k by exclusively occupying channel k. In this case, the expected data rate that APO k's users receive is K −1+η APO K r k . We note that APO k does not win the auction in either of the following two cases: b k > min j ∈K b j and min j ∈K b j = "N". However, the APO k's payoff is different in these two cases: it obtains a payoff of r k when b k > min j ∈K b j , and achieves a 10 Notice that min k∈K b k ∈ [0, C] contains two possible situations: smaller payoff of K −1+η APO K r k when min j ∈K b j = "N". That is to say, even if APO k does not win the auction, it is more willing to see the other APOs winning (i.e., b k > min j ∈K b j ) rather than losing the auction (i.e., min j ∈K b j = "N"). This shows positive allocative externalities of the auction, which make our problem substantially different from conventional auction problems. At the equilibrium of the conventional second-price auction, bidders bid truthfully according to their private values, regardless of other bidders' valuations. With allocative externalities in our problem, when APO k evaluates its payoff when losing the auction, it needs to consider whether the other APOs win the auction or not. Hence, the distributions of the other APOs' valuations (types) affect APO k's strategy. As we will show in the following sections, this leads to a special structure of APOs' bidding strategies at the equilibrium, and bidding truthfully is no longer a dominate strategy.
We summarize the main notations in Table I . For the parameters and distributions that characterize the APOs, r k is APO k's private information, and the remaining information, i.e., K , r min , r max , f (·) , F (·) , and η APO , is publicly known to all the APOs and the LTE provider. For the parameters that characterize the LTE provider, i.e., R LTE and δ LTE , as we will see in later sections, they will not affect the APOs' strategies. Therefore, they can be either known or unknown to the APOs.
Next we analyze the auction by backward induction. In Section III, we analyze the APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II, given the LTE provider's reserve rate C in Stage I.
In Section IV, we analyze the LTE provider's equilibrium reserve rate C * in Stage I by anticipating the APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II.
III. STAGE II: APOS' EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGIES
In this section, we assume that the reserve rate C of the LTE provider in Stage I is given, and analyze the APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II. In Section III-A, we define the equilibrium for the APOs under a given C. In Sections III-B, III-C, III-D, and III-E, we analyze the APOs' equilibrium strategies by considering different intervals of C. In Section III-F, we summarize the results for the APOs' equilibrium strategies.
A. Definition of Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We focus on the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (SBNE), which is defined as follows.
Definition 1: Under a reserve rate C, a bidding strategy function b * (r, C), r ∈ [r min , r max ], constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the following inequality holds for all s k ∈ [0, C]∪{"N"}, all r k ∈ [r min , r max ], and all k ∈ K :
Since it is the symmetric equilibrium, all the APOs apply the same bidding strategy function b * (r, C) at the equilibrium. The left hand side of inequality (6) stands for APO k's expected payoff when it bids b * (r k , C). The expectation is taken with respect to r −k r j , ∀ j = k, j ∈ K , which denotes all the other APOs' types and is unknown to APO k. Inequality (6) implies that APO k ∈ K cannot improve its expected payoff by unilaterally changing its bid from b * (r k , C) to any s k ∈ [0, C] ∪ {"N"}.
B. APOs' Equilibrium When C ∈ [r min , r max )
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from [r min , r max ), 11 and show the unique form of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE. We first introduce the following lemma (the proofs of all lemmas and theorems can be found in [20] ).
Lemma 1: The following equation admits at least one solution r in (C, r max ):
where F (·) is the CDF of random variable r k , k ∈ K . We denote the solutions r in (C, r max ) as r t 1 (C) , r t 2 (C) , . . . , r t M (C), where M = 1, 2, . . . , is the number of solutions.
Based on the definition of r t 1 (C) , r t 2 (C) , . . . , r t M (C) in Lemma 1, we introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Consider an r T (C) ∈ (C, r max ) that belongs to the set of r t 1 (C) , r t 2 (C) , . . . , r t M (C) , then the following bidding strategy b * constitutes an SBNE:
for all k ∈ K . We illustrate the structure of strategy b * in Fig. 2 , in which we notice that 11 We first analyze the case where C ∈ [r min , r max ), because it has the most complicated equilibrium analysis. We can apply a similar analysis approach in this Section to the other cases. (a) For an APO k with type r k ∈ (r min , C], it bids r k . In other words, APO k requests the LTE provider to serve APO k's users with at least the rate that APO k can achieve by exclusively occupying channel k;
(b) For an APO k with type r k ∈ (C, r T (C)), it bids C. Since C < r k , the data rate APO k requests from the LTE provider is smaller than the rate that APO k achieves by exclusively occupying channel k. Recall that the feasible bid should be from [0, C] ∪ {"N"}. If APO k bids "N", there is a chance that all the other APOs also bid "N", which makes the LTE provider work in the competition mode and leads to a payoff of K −1+η APO K r k to APO k based on (5) . In order to avoid such a situation, APO k would bid C, and ensure that its payoff is at least C; 12 (c) For an APO k with type r k ∈ (r T (C) , r max ], it bids "N". Similar as case (b), there is a chance that all the other APOs also bid "N", and APO k obtains a payoff of K −1+η APO K r k . However, with r k ∈ (r T (C) , r max ], the value K −1+η APO K r k is already large enough so that there is no need for APO k to lower its bid from "N" to any value from [0, C].
There are two special points in (8):
(d) For an APO k with r k = r min , it has the same payoff if it bids any value from [0, r min ]. This is because with probability one, APO k wins the auction. 13 From (3) and (5), APO k's payoff is min {C, b 1 , . . . , b k−1 , b k+1 , . . . , b K }, which does not depend on APO k's bid b k and is always no smaller than r min ;
(e) For an APO k with r k = r T (C), it has the same expected payoff under bids C and "N".
It is easy to show that b * (r k , C) in (8) is not a dominant strategy for the APOs. For example, if APO k's type r k ∈ (C, r T (C)) and min j ∈K , j =k b j = C, bidding "N" generates a larger payoff to APO k than bidding b * (r k , C) = C. This result is different from that of the conventional second-price auction, where bidding the truthful valuation constitutes an equilibrium, and is also the weakly dominant strategy for the bidders.
Notice that equation (7) may admit multiple solutions, i.e., M > 1. Based on Theorem 1, each solution r t m , m = 1, 2, . . . , M, corresponds to a strategy b * defined in (8) .
In the following theorem, we show the unique form of bidding strategy under an SBNE. 12 Specifically, based on (3), if APO k bids C and wins the auction, its payoff will be C; if APO k bids C but loses the auction, its payoff will be r k > C. 13 Notice that for any APO j = k, j ∈ K , the probability that r j = r min is zero based on the continuous distribution of r j . In other words, with probability one, r j is from the interval (r min , r max ]. Based on (8), APO j = k bids from (r min , C] ∪ {"N"} and APO k wins the auction.
Theorem 2: The strategy function in (8) is the unique form of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE.
The sketch of the proof is as follows: first, we show the necessary conditions that a bidding strategy needs to satisfy to constitute an SBNE; second, we show that the function in (8) is the only function that satisfies all these conditions. We leave the detailed proof in [20] .
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval 0, K −1+η APO K r min , and summarize the form of the bidding strategy at the SBNE in the following theorem. We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval K −1+η APO K r min , r min , and show that the bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE has a unique form. First, we introduce the following lemma. Lemma 2: The following equation admits at least one solution r in (r min , r max ):
where F (·) is the CDF of random variable r k , k ∈ K . We denote the solutions r in (r min , r max ) as r x
Based on the definition of r x 1 (C) , r x 2 (C) , . . . , r x L (C) in Lemma 2, we introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 4: When C ∈ K −1+η APO K r min , r min , consider an r X (C) ∈ (r min , r max ) that belongs to the set of r x 1 (C) , r x 2 (C) , . . . , r x L (C) , then the following bidding strategy b * constitutes an SBNE:
where k ∈ K . Furthermore, such a bidding strategy b * is the unique form of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE. 14 In Theorem 3, when C = K −1+η APO K r min , the APO with type r min can bid any value. However, the probability for an APO to have the type r min is zero due to the continuous distribution of r. The bidding strategy in (11) is similar to that in (8) , except that here it only has two regions instead of three regions. Specifically, here there are no APOs that bid their types r k . This is because here the reserve rate C is smaller than r min , hence bidding any type r k ∈ [r min , r max ] is not feasible. We illustrate the structure of strategy function b * in Fig. 3 .
Similar as the equilibrium analysis for C ∈ [r min , r max ), here equation (10) may admit multiple solutions, i.e., L > 1, in which case each solution r x l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L, corresponds to a strategy b * defined in (11) .
E. APOs' Equilibrium When C ∈ [r max , ∞)
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval C ∈ [r max , ∞), and show the unique form of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE in the following theorem. 
F. Summary of APOs' Equilibriums
Based on Sections III-B, III-C, III-D, and III-E, there is always a unique form of APO k's bidding strategy b * (r k , C) at the SBNE for any reserve rate C ∈ [0, ∞). We summarize the APOs' strategies under different intervals of C in Fig. 4 . 16 We find that some APO types bid the reserve rate C in Fig. 4 when C ∈ K −1+η APO K r min , r max . This is due to the unique feature of the auction with allocative externalities: first, if none of the other APOs submits its bid from interval [0, C], these types of APOs prefer to cooperate with the LTE provider rather than to interfere with the LTE in the competition mode; second, if at least one of the other APOs submits its bid from interval [0, C], these types of APOs prefer to occupy their own channels rather than to cooperate with the LTE provider, as the LTE will not generate interference to their channels in this case. The first reason motivates these APO types to bid from interval [0, C], and the second reason motivates these APO types to reduce their chances of winning the auction as much as possible. As a result, these APO types bid the reserve rate C at the equilibrium.
IV. STAGE I: LTE PROVIDER'S RESERVE RATE
In this section, we analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate by anticipating APOs' equilibrium strategies in Stage II. In Section IV-A, we define the LTE provider's expected payoff. In Section IV-B, we formulate the LTE provider's payoff maximization problem. In Section IV-C, we analyze the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate C * .
A. Definition of LTE Provider's Expected Payoff
We first make the following assumption on the CDF of an APO's type.
Assumption 1: Under the cumulative distribution function F (·), (a) equation (7) has a unique solution in (C, r max ), i.e., M = 1, and (b) equation (10) has a unique solution in (r min , r max ), i.e., L = 1.
Assumption 1 implies that r T (C) and r X (C) are unique. Such an assumption is mild. When K = 2, we have proved that Assumption 1 holds for the uniform distribution. For a general K , we have run simulation and shown that Assumption 1 holds for both the uniform distribution and truncated normal distribution. The details of the proof and simulation can be found in [20] .
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the uniqueness of r T (C) implies the unique expression of APOs' bidding strategy b * for C ∈ [r min , r max ). Similarly, from Theorem 4, the uniqueness of r X (C) implies the unique expression of
We define the LTE provider's expected payoff as
where r (r k , ∀k ∈ K ) denotes the types of all APOs, and b * (r k , C), k ∈ K denotes the APOs' bidding strategies under C. Based on (8), (9), (11) , and (12), b * (r k , C) has different forms for four different intervals of C, which implies that the expressions of¯ LTE (C) are different for these four intervals of C. In order to save space, we provide the detailed characterization of¯ LTE (C) in [20] . Next we discuss the choice of C * based on Theorem 6.
r min , Theorem 6 indicates that any value from interval 0, K −1+η APO K r min is the optimal C * for a general distribution function F (·) . However, when
r min , it is difficult to characterize the closed-form expression of C * even under a specific function F (·). This is because (i) it is difficult to solve equations (7) and (10) and obtain the closed-form expressions of r T (C) and r X (C), respectively, and (ii) the corresponding expression of¯ LTE (C) is complicated and hard to analyze. Therefore, we determine the optimal C * numerically (through the Golden Section method [23] 
r min , and we leave the details in [20] .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first investigate the impacts of the system parameters on the LTE's optimal reserve rate and the APOs' equilibrium strategies. Then we compare our auction-based spectrum sharing scheme with a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme.
A. Influences of System Parameters 1) Influence of K :
We study the impact of the number of APOs K on the LTE provider's and APOs' strategies. We choose R LTE = 95 Mbps, δ LTE = 0.4, and η APO = 0.3, and assume that r k , k ∈ K , follows a truncated normal distribution. 17 Specifically, we obtain the distribution of r k by truncating the normal distribution N 125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps 2 to interval 50 Mbps, 200 Mbps . We change K from 2 to 7, and determine the corresponding optimal reserve rate C * numerically.
We plot C * against K in Fig. 5 , and observe that C * increases with K . This is because that the probability of a particular APO being interfered by the LTE in the competition mode decreases with the number of APOs. Hence, the APOs are less willing to cooperate with the LTE provider under a larger K , and the LTE provider needs to increase C * to attract the APOs. 17 In a practical implementation, the values of δ LTE and η APO depend on the applied coexistence mechanism (e.g., LBT or CSAT) and the corresponding settings (e.g., LTE off time in CSAT). We choose η APO smaller than δ LTE , because the degeneration of Wi-Fi's data rate due to the co-channel interference is usually heavier than that of the LTE [10] . In Fig. 5 , we observe that C * ∈ K −1+η APO K r min , r min for 2 ≤ K ≤ 4. Based on (11) , in this case, APOs with types in r min , r X (C * )) and (r X (C * ) , r max bid C * and "N", respectively. To study the impact of K on the APOs' strategies, we plot r X (C * ) for 2 ≤ K ≤ 4 in Fig. 5 . We observe that r X (C * ) decreases with K . This means that when K increases from 2 to 4, more APOs bid "N" instead of C * . On the other hand, we find that C * ∈ [r min , r max ) for 5 ≤ K ≤ 7. Based on (8) , in this case, APOs with types in C * , r T (C * )) and (r T (C * ) , r max bid C * and "N", respectively. We plot r T (C * ) for 5 ≤ K ≤ 7, and observe that r T (C * ) decreases with K . Since C * increases with K , it is easy to conclude that when K increases from 5 to 7, fewer APOs bid C * , and more APOs bid "N". Combining the observations for 2 ≤ K ≤ 4 and 5 ≤ K ≤ 7, we summarize that the increase of K makes more APOs switch from bidding C * to bidding "N". The reason is that each APO has a smaller chance to be interfered by the LTE in the competition mode under a larger K . Therefore, the APOs with large r k are less willing to cooperate with the LTE provider, and more APOs bid "N" instead of C * .
We summarize the observations for Fig. 5 as follows. Observation 1: When the number of APOs increases, (i) the LTE provider's optimal reserve rate C * increases, and (ii) more APOs switch from bidding C * to bidding "N".
2) Influences of R LTE , δ LTE , and η APO : We investigate the impacts of parameters R LTE , δ LTE , and η APO on C * . We choose K = 4, and the distribution of r k is the same as that in Fig Under all four settings, we observe that C * does not change with R LTE when R LTE is below K −1+η APO K (1−δ LTE ) r min . In this case, the LTE provider does not have enough capacity to satisfy the APOs' requests. Based on Theorem 6, it chooses a small reserve rate, and works in the competition mode. When R LTE is above K −1+η APO K (1−δ LTE ) r min , C * increases with R LTE . This is because with a larger throughput R LTE , the LTE provider is able to allocate a larger data rate to the winning APO, and hence it increases the reserve rate C * to attract the APOs.
With δ LTE = 0.4, we find that C * increases with η APO (see the top three curves). This is because under a larger η APO , the APOs are less heavily interfered by the LTE, and hence are less willing to cooperate with the LTE provider. As a result, the LTE provider needs to increase its reserve rate to attract the APOs.
With η APO = 0.3, we find that C * under δ LTE = 0.4 is no smaller than that under δ LTE = 0.6. Under a smaller δ LTE , the LTE provider is more heavily affected by the interference from Wi-Fi. In this case, the LTE provider chooses a larger reserve rate C * to motivate the cooperation with the APOs. Furthermore, compared with η APO , we find that the difference in δ LTE leads to a larger difference in C * , which shows that δ LTE has a larger impact on C * than η APO .
We summarize the observations in Fig. 6 as follows. Observation 2: The optimal reserve rate C * is nondecreasing in R LTE , increasing in η APO , and non-increasing in δ LTE . Moreover, δ LTE has a larger impact on C * than η APO .
B. Comparison With The Benchmark Scheme
In this section, we compare our auction-based spectrum sharing scheme with a benchmark scheme. Given a set K of APOs, the two schemes work as follows:
• Our auction-based scheme: First, the LTE provider determines C * numerically (based on the Golden Section method). Second, each APO k ∈ K submits its bid based on the equilibrium strategy b * (r k , C * ) in Section III. Third, the LTE provider determines its working mode, the winning APO, and the allocated rate based on the auction rule in Section II-B. • Benchmark scheme: The LTE provider randomly shares a channel with one of the K APOs. For a particular set of APOs, we denote the LTE provider's payoff under our auction-based and the benchmark schemes as π LTE a and π LTE b , respectively. 18 Furthermore, we denote the APOs' total payoff under our auction-based and the benchmark schemes as π APO a and π APO b , respectively. For a given set of APOs, we compute the relative performance gains of our auction-based scheme over the benchmark scheme in terms of the LTE's payoff and the APOs' total payoff as Fig. 6 . Given a pair of δ LTE , η APO and a particular value of R LTE , we randomly choose r k , k ∈ K , based on the truncated normal distribution, implement our auction-based scheme and the benchmark scheme separately, and record the corresponding values of ρ LTE and ρ APO . For each pair of δ LTE , η APO and each value of R LTE , we run 18 Note that¯ LTE C * is the expectation of π LTE a with respect to the APO types. the experiment 20, 000 times, and obtain the corresponding average values of ρ LTE and ρ APO .
In Fig. 7 , we plot the average ρ LTE against R LTE for different δ LTE , η APO pairs. First, we observe that the average ρ LTE increases with R LTE . In particular, all the average ρ LTE with δ LTE = 0.4 are above 70% for R LTE = 370 Mbps (the maximum LTE throughput according to [11] ). That is to say, our auction-based scheme's performance gain on the LTE provider's payoff is more significant for a larger R LTE . The reason is that a larger R LTE enables the LTE provider to set a larger reserve rate, which increases the probability for the cooperation between the LTE provider and the APOs. Second, when η APO = 0.3 and δ LTE increases from 0.4 to 0.6, the average ρ LTE decreases significantly. Since a larger δ LTE implies that the coexistence with Wi-Fi reduces the LTE's payoff less significantly, the cooperation with Wi-Fi is less beneficial to the LTE provider, which decreases the average ρ LTE . Third, when δ LTE = 0.4 and η APO changes from 0.1 to 0.7, the change in the average ρ LTE is small. Hence, η APO has a smaller impact on the average ρ LTE comparing with δ LTE . We summarize the observations in Fig. 7 as follows.
Observation 3: Compared with the benchmark scheme, our auction-based scheme improves the LTE's payoff by 70% on average under a large R LTE and a small δ LTE . Moreover, the performance gain is not sensitive to η APO .
In Fig. 8 , we plot the average ρ APO against R LTE for different δ LTE , η APO pairs. First, we observe that the average ρ APO increases with R LTE . Similar as the explanation for ρ LTE , this is because a larger R LTE leads to a larger reserve rate, and creates more cooperation opportunities between the LTE provider and the APOs. Second, the average ρ APO is large when both δ LTE and η APO are small. In this case, there is a heavy interference between the LTE and the APOs in the competition mode, and the both of them want to avoid the interference through the cooperation. Therefore, our auction-based scheme is much more efficient, and achieves a large ρ APO . We summarize the observations in Fig. 8 as follows.
Observation 4: Compared with the benchmark scheme, our auction-based scheme is most beneficial to the APOs for a large R LTE and small δ LTE and η APO .
2) Performance on Social Welfare: We consider δ LTE , η APO = (0.4, 0.3), and choose the same settings as Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 for the other parameters. In Fig. 9 , we plot the average social welfares of the two schemes, and also show the average value of the maximum social welfare. To compute the maximum social welfare for a particular set of APOs, we assume that there is a centralized decision maker, who allocates K channels to the LTE provider and the K APOs in a manner that maximizes the social welfare. 19 For each experiment, we randomly pick a set of APOs and record the social welfare achieved by the centralized decision maker. We run the experiment 20, 000 times, and obtain the average value of the maximum social welfare.
When R LTE increases, the social welfare gain of our auctionbased scheme over the benchmark scheme increases, and the average social welfare under our auction-based scheme approaches the maximum social welfare. This is because when R LTE is large, it is always good for the LTE to exclusively occupy a channel to maximize the social welfare. For our auction-based scheme, the increase of R LTE improves the cooperation chance between the LTE and the APOs, and hence increases the probability for the LTE to exclusively occupy a channel. The result in Fig. 9 shows that in our auction-based scheme, even the LTE provider and APOs make decisions to maximize their own payoffs, and the LTE provider and each APO do not have the complete information on the other APOs' types, the eventual auction outcome leads to a close-to-optimal social welfare for a large R LTE . We summarize the observation in Fig. 9 as follows.
Observation 5: Our auction-based scheme leads to a closeto-optimal social welfare when R LTE is large. 19 Specifically, the centralized decision maker can choose to: (i) keep the LTE idle, and allocate all channels to the APOs, (ii) keep one APO idle, and allocate all channels to the LTE and the remaining K −1 APOs, or (iii) let the LTE share one channel with one APO, and allocate the remaining channels to the remaining K − 1 APOs.
VI. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND MODEL EXTENSION
In this section, we discuss the implementation and extensions of our auction framework.
In a practical implementation, a centralized broker (e.g., a private company or a company designated by the government) can coordinate the interactions between the LTE provider and APOs. Specifically, the LTE provider can announce the reserve rate to the broker at the beginning of each time slot. The APOs that are interested in participating in the auction can communicate with the broker to obtain the reserve rate information and submit their bids to the broker. Then the broker determines the winning APO based on our auction rule, and broadcasts this result to the LTE provider and APOs. With the broker's help, the LTE provider does not need to directly communicate with all surrounding APOs. In [20] , we further introduce the centralized broker with an example from the TV white space networks.
In reality, some users' mobile devices, such as the laptops, do not have the LTE interfaces. The existence of these mobile devices prevents the corresponding APOs from participating in the auction and onloading all of their traffic to the LTE network. Our analysis can be directly extended to the case where some APOs cannot onload all of their traffic to the LTE network. The major change is that when the LTE provider works in the competition mode, the expected payoff of an APO depends on the number of all APOs (including the APOs that cannot onload their traffic and participate in the auction), instead of the number of APOs participating in the auction. Due to space limit, we leave the detailed discussion in [20] .
Our framework can be extended to the scenario where there are multiple LTE providers. Specifically, the LTE providers can take turns to organize the auctions, which can be managed by the centralized broker. When a particular LTE provider organizes an auction, it needs to consider the number of other LTE providers in each channel. This is because the benefit for the LTE provider to cooperate with an APO decreases with the number of other LTE providers using the same channel. Moreover, an APO should choose the bidding strategy based on the number of LTE providers in the same channel as well as the APO's throughput r k . We provide the detailed protocol design, model, analysis, and simulation results for the multi-LTE scenario in [20] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a framework for LTE's coopetition with Wi-Fi in the unlicensed spectrum. We designed a reverse auction for the LTE provider to exclusively obtain the channel from the APOs by onloading their traffic. Compared with the existing LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence mechanisms like LBT and CSAT, our auction can potentially avoid the interference between the LTE and APOs. The analysis of the auction is quite challenging as the designed auction involves positive allocative externalities. We characterized the unique form of the APOs' bidding strategies at the equilibrium, and analyzed the optimal reserve rate of the LTE provider. Numerical results showed that our framework benefits both the LTE provider and the APOs, and it achieves a close-to-optimal social welfare under a large LTE throughput. In our future work, we can generalize our model by considering heterogeneous throughput distributions for the APOs. Moreover, we will study the scenario where the networks do not have full loads, and analyze the corresponding performance of our auction framework.
